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Abstract
Social network information is now being used in ways for
which it may have not been originally intended. In partic-
ular, increased use of smartphones capable of running ap-
plications which access social network information enable
applications to be aware of a user’s position and preferences.
However, current models for exchange of this information re-
quire users to compromise their privacy. We present a frame-
work called Secure SocialAware (SSA) which allows for
the interaction of social network information with real-world
location-based services without compromising user privacy
and security. Through exchanging an encrypted nonce (EID)
associated with a verified user location, SSA allows location-
based services to query the local area for social network in-
formation without disclosing user identity or any set of in-
formation which could be positively matched to users. We
argue that it is important that such a framework be accepted
as mobile social networks are growing exponentially.
Keywords
design, security, privacy, mobile computing, social net-
works
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks: Gen-
eral]: security and privacy.
1 Introduction
Online social networks provide the opportunity to sub-
stantially enrich interaction with ubiquitous computing envi-
ronments by integrating social context information into local
interactions. New middleware infrastructure must be intro-
duced to harness the rich personal preference and friendship
information contained in social networking sites so that in-
teraction with the local ubiquitous computing environment
is conveniently personalized. Location-aware mobile social
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networks such as WhozThat [1] and Serendipity [2] pro-
vide the infrastructure to leverage social networking context
within a local physical proximity using mobile smartphones.
However, such systems pay little heed to the security and
privacy concerns associated with revealing one’s personal
social networking preferences and friendship information to
the ubiquitous computing environment.
This paper describes Secure SocialAware (SSA), a gen-
eral framework to support secure and anonymous exchange
of social network or other personal information throughout
a user’s physical location. A system may use such an ar-
chitecture to gather data on the history and preferences of
users in a particular area without compromising those users’
privacy. For instance a media player may query the media
preferences of users within a certain geographical area (as
large as a city or as small as a room), and then use that
information to automatically distribute media in real time.
The system may process the media preferences in different
ways to achieve different goals, however it should not be able
to use this information to identify the users in the specified
area. The abundance of such Internet-accessible information
and the abundance of diversity among this information make
this privacy guarantee more complicated than it may sound
at first. SSA seeks to provide location-based personal in-
formation which may be used to discern the possibility of a
specific user’s presence, without linking that presence with
a specific user’s identity. That is, the information provided
by SSA may used to discern if a user is not in the area, but
never whether the user is in the area.
Privacy or privacy threats are often referred to in the dis-
cussion of social networks and mobile computing, however
the examples given are often spurious or incomplete. Exam-
ples themselves are rarely enough to fully describe a range
of privacy threats within an area as wide as mobile com-
puting, however they are often the quickest and sometimes
only way to convey a sense of the existing problems within
the dynamic space of social networks and mobile computing.
Initially the authors of this paper sought to better formalize
the threats which motivated this work, however the threats
seem as dynamic and forthcoming as the technology and us-
age habits associated with them. As such, examples are what
the authors have to work with and a few of these will be dis-
cussed below to give the reader a sense of the novelty and
urgency motivating this work.
Given the identity of a social network user, be it a name
or worse, an identity number, certain “public” information
can immediately be accessed, along with more personal in-
formation depending on source-specific settings. This infor-
mation has been shown to be easily used to track or steal
a user’s identity. Often users of social networks and mo-
bile apps do not understand the details of how their informa-
tion is accessed. For instance, Facebook users may assume
that “friending” another user gives that user special access
to their data. Indeed they would be right, however they are
not just giving that user special access to the data, they are
giving that user the “right” or at least ability to use the data
and give it away to any third-party applications they choose
to use. Currently, third-party application platforms on social
networks are designed to exchange services (the application
services) for access to users’ data. This model is now being
extended to mobile-phone applications, such as those that
Facebook claims are being developed by over 150 mobile op-
erators in over 50 countries [3]). While many Internet users
have now becomemore wary of what websites they give their
information to, they are often not very careful about what
third-party applications they install on their phones or add to
their social network profile. The Facebook Statistics page [3]
states that there are over 660,000 application developers for
their site and that more than 70% of Facebook users inter-
act with the applications created by these developers. Like-
wise the iPhone is seeing unexpectedly high usage of mobile
apps, with over 1 billion downloaded from the App Store [4].
Obviously users are showing interest in third-party applica-
tions which use their social networking information or inter-
act with their mobile devices. SSA allows this interaction
without sacrificing the user’s identity or compromising ac-
cess to private data which users prefer not to share.
This work draws on some previous privacy research in
both Location Based Services and Social Networks. Pre-
vious work at Duke University [5] [6] has dealt with pri-
vacy and anonymity questions as they apply to sharing pres-
ence information with other users and matching users with
a shared location and time. These works do not approach
the same problem as addressed in this paper, however the
mechanisms used in these papers may provide certain func-
tions necessary to associate user preferences anonymously
with user location for use in third-party applications. For
instance, SmokeScreen [5] presents a protocol by which de-
vices may broadcast identifiers which can be resolved to an
identity through a trusted broker system. This identity could
then be used to access personal information to drive third-
party applications. SSA, however, differs in that it seeks to
hide the user’s identity while distributing certain personal in-
formation. The Serendipity project [2] at MIT is an example
of a mobile social network in which users used their phones
to send and receive social context information, and detect
nearby users. Commercial examples of mobile social net-
works include Loopt [7] and Brightkite [8]. Indeed, many
new applications allow users to use existing personal infor-
mation in much the same way as these mobile social net-
works.
2 Location-Aware Mobile Social Network
Systems
This section intends to give the user an introduction to
the type of systems which SSA supports. Generally these
systems allow personal information (usually from social net-
works) to be used by third-party applications. First we will
discuss how third-party applications already function within
social networks and on smartphones. Next, a few prototype
architectures will be discussed along with the security and
privacy problems associated with each architecture.
2.1 Online Social Network Applications
Currently social network sites such as Facebook [9] and
Myspace [10] allow users to add applications or widgets
which extend how users interact with the system and its
data. For instance on Facebook you can download applica-
tions which search out which of your friends are also friends
with each other and then proceed to automatically generate
clustered friend graphs. These applications require (and are
given access) not only to the application user’s information,
but to all information which that user has access to, such as
if the user’s friends are friends of each other.
2.2 Mobile Phone Applications
The iPhone App Store sells applications which can both
access existing social networks (Facebook’s “iPhone App”),
access mobile social networks (Loopt), and allow users to
find and contact users around them (WhosHere App [11]).
These applications use access to the Internet and the iPhone’s
location service, which takes advantage of GPS or triangula-
tion using cell towers or WiFi hotspots. Tying location ser-
vices together with social network information allows appli-
cations in the real world to react to their local environment
in user-specific ways.
2.3 Peer-to-Peer Mobile Social Networking:
WhozThat
In [1] a vision was presented for WhozThat, a sys-
tem for answering the basic social question of “Who’s
that?”. WhozThat ties together existing online social net-
works with mobile smartphones, and provides an infrastruc-
ture for building a new class of context-aware applications
that leverage social network information. Social networks
provide access to an extensive collection of personal in-
formation about users, including name, gender, contact in-
formation, interests, music preferences, movie preferences,
book preferences, and friendship connections with others,
which represent but a few of the fields that users populate
on their social network profiles.
WhozThat uses a peer-to-peer model for sharing users’
social network identifiers among smartphones and other de-
vices, where social network IDs are broadcast using a wire-
less technology such as Bluetooth or WiFi. WhozThat’s
identity sharing protocol enables applications such as chat,
social network profile viewing, and user search based on
specified criteria. The peer-to-peer exchange of information
in this system is shown in figure 1. With WhozThat, a user
can walk into a shared physical space and determine who in
the room has interests similar to the user’s. The user can then
proceed to view the social network profile of that person and
even contact him/her directly through chat.
Figure 1. Peer-to-peer information exchange in
WhozThat
TheWhozThat prototype system was implemented by ad-
vertising a plain-text representation of the user’s Facebook
ID over Bluetooth. When a user enters a new space, his/her
mobile device queries the list of Bluetooth devices in the
room and then queries each device for its user’s Facebook
ID. This ID is then used to access each user’s Facebook pro-
file information using the Facebook API web service [12]
through an Internet connection. This gives users access to
whatever information they could normally access if using
Facebook, without breaking Facebook privacy rules. How-
ever, simply not breaking Facebook privacy rules still allows
the user’s own privacy to be compromised. Given a user’s
Facebook ID one could easily access the user’s public infor-
mation and approximate the location of that user. This kind
of system fits the existing Facebook application model while
exhibiting severe and obvious privacy problems.
2.4 Context-Aware Services: Basic So-
cialAware Architecture
A framework for building context-aware mobile social
networking services in a ubiquitous computing environment,
called SocialAware, is described in [13]. SocialAware ap-
plications use WhozThat’s identity sharing protocol for ex-
changing users’ social network IDs among mobile and sta-
tionary devices. SocialAware differs from WhozThat in that
it is built around a stationary system (called the Stationary
Component or SC) for which each mobile client (called the
Mobile Component or MC) is an information provider to the
stationary system. The information provided by each Mobile
Component is the user’s social network ID and the informa-
tion being used by the Stationary Component is the user’s
social network profile information associated with his/her
social network ID. Two prototype SocialAware applications
are described in [13], both of which present multimedia (ei-
ther movie trailers or music) in the vicinity of the mobile
clients that fits the media preferences of each mobile client
user as expressed on their Facebook profiles. In order to
determine what actions to take based on the user’s prefer-
ences, the SC consults one or more domain-specific web ser-
vice recommender systems. One example of such a recom-
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Figure 2. Basic SocialAware architecture
mender systems is the Netflix REST API web service [14].
Figure 2 shows the SocialAware system model. This system
can be seen as a simple model for the basic components of
any context-aware system that leverages social networks, in
which the context is the user’s location and personal infor-
mation which must be exchanged with a central system.
2.5 Privacy & Security Issues
The information exchange model of the systems dis-
cussed in this section provide little protection for user’s pri-
vacy. These systems require the user to allow access to their
social network profile information and at the same time asso-
ciate that information with the user’s identity. For instance,
Facebook applications generally require the user to agree to
give the application access to his/her information through
Facebook’s API, intrinsically tying such information to the
user’s identity. In the WhozThat and SocialAware systems,
anybody near the mobile user can use a Bluetooth device to
snoop a user’s shared social network ID or eavesdrop on data
sent openly over a wireless connection, since all data trans-
mitted over the wireless connection is sent without encryp-
tion.
Once a user’s social network ID has been intercepted, it
can be used to mount a replay and spoofing attack. In a
spoofing attack, a malicious user can masquerade as the user
whose ID was intercepted (the compromised user) by sim-
ply sending (replaying) the intercepted ID to systems that
request the user’s social network ID. Thus, the replay attack,
where the compromised user’s ID is maliciously repeated,
is used to perform the spoofing attack. Another specific
type of replay attack is known as a wormhole attack [15],
where wireless transmissions are captured on one end of the
network and replayed on another end of the network. In a
system such as WhozThat or SocialAware, a malicious user
could use a wormhole attack to capture a user’s ID and mas-
querade as that user in a different, perhaps distant, location.
Since the systems described in this section are vulnerable
to such replay and spoofing attacks, we can no longer trust
that each user who participates in these systems is really who
they claim to be. Therefore, the value of such systems is
substantially diminished. Furthermore, these attacks could
be used for a variety of nefarious purposes. For example, a
malicious user could masquerade as the compromised user at
a specific time and place while committing a crime. Clearly,
spoofing attacks in mobile social networking systems present
serious security risks.
In a context-aware mobile social network system such as
SocialAware, we can track a user by logging the date and
time that each mobile or stationary device detects a user’s
social network ID. By collecting such logs, we can construct
a history of the locations that a user has visited and the times
of each visit, compromising the user’s privacy. Finally, given
access to a user’s social network ID, someone else could ac-
cess that user’s public information in a way the user may
not have intended by simply viewing that user’s public pro-
file on a social network Web site. We conclude that clear-
text exchange of social networking IDs in systems such as
WhozThat and SocialAware leads to unacceptable security
and privacy risks.
While the existing context-aware mobile social network-
ing systems described in this section provide examples of
how social network information can be used to increase the
value of users’ physical or Internet experiences by tailoring
these experiences to users’ specific preferences, they also
demonstrate the dangers posed by such systems when imple-
mented in the most naive or direct way. These dangers are
the primary motivation for SSA. Namely, we seek to provide
personally tailored context-aware services to users without
compromising their privacy.
3 Secure SocialAware Architecture
The Secure SocialAware (SSA) framework consists of
three major components: the stationary component (SC), the
mobile component (MC), and the authentication server (AS).
The SC is embedded into the user’s environment, while the
MC component resides on mobile devices. The SC is respon-
sible for detecting the presence of users, obtaining informa-
tion about these users from the AS, and performing actions
based on this information. The MC on a user’s mobile device
is responsible for advertising that user’s encrypted identifier
(EID) using a wireless technology such as Bluetooth so that
it is available to the SC. The AS generates unique EIDs for
each MC, and provides a service to the SC so that the SC can
obtain the user’s information from a social networking web
site given an EID.
The AS allows SCs and MCs to join the SSA system by
signing up for stationary and mobile user accounts, respec-
tively. After a mobile user signs up for a user account, the
AS assigns that user a unique EID. The AS provides secure
services that the MC uses to determine its EID and inform
the AS of its current location. The AS also provides a secure
service that the SC uses to retrieve the mobile user’s infor-
mation from a social networking Web site given that user’s
EID. To obtain user information from a social networking
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Figure 3. Secure SocialAware architecture
site, the AS maintains a mapping of EIDs to social network
profile identifiers. Figure 3 shows the architecture of SSA.
3.1 Stationary Component
The SSA framework provides a stationary component
that is embedded into the user’s environment. In the So-
cialAwareFlicks example application discussed in the Im-
plementation and Evaluation section of this paper, this com-
ponent detects the EID of each nearby user and obtains infor-
mation about the users’ movie preferences from their Face-
book profiles by accessing a secure service provided by the
AS.
After obtaining information about detected users from a
social networking Web site, the SC must use this informa-
tion to infer something about the users and take appropriate
action based on this inference. For the SocialAwareFlicks
application, an external Web service is accessed to obtain
movie recommendations based on the preference informa-
tion provided on a user’s Facebook profile. After obtaining
these recommendations for each user, we use a set of heuris-
tics to create a movie trailer playlist that accommodates the
possibly varying tastes of the detected users in the group.
The Implementation and Evaluation section describes the
implementation of the SC for the SocialAwareFlicks appli-
cation in more detail.
The SC is assumed to be a trusted component in SSA. As
such, each SC that joins the SSA system must sign up for a
SC user account on the AS. During the signup process, the
SC administrator selects a user name and password, which
together form the SC user credentials. These user credentials
are used to authenticate access to all AS services used by
the SC. All communication between the AS and SC occurs
over an encrypted connection, using a technology such as
HTTPS. In addition to selecting a user name and password,
the SC administrator also sets the location coordinates for
the SC during the signup process. Since the SC is a trusted
component, we assume that the SC location is not falsified.
3.2 Mobile Component
The mobile component of the SSA framework is found on
a user’s mobile device. TheMC shares the mobile user’s EID
and the current timestamp with the SC. This information will
typically be shared with the SC using a short-range wireless
technology such as Bluetooth, although other mechanisms
may be used since SSA treats the ID sharing technology as an
abstraction. For instance, while we are using a wireless peer-
to-peer model to exchange EIDs, SSA can support systems
which exchange EIDs through a secure server based system.
TheMCmust join the SSA system in order to obtain EIDs
from the AS. The mobile user joins the SSA system by sign-
ing up for a MC user account on the AS. During the signup
process, the mobile user selects a user name and password,
which form the MC user credentials. After account signup
has been completed, these user credentials are used to au-
thenticate access to all AS services used by theMC. All com-
munication between the AS and SC occurs over an encrypted
connection, using a technology such as HTTPS. Before the
MC shares an EID, it sends a service request to the AS to ob-
tain the current EID for this mobile user. The generation of
this EID on the AS is explained in the Authentication Server
subsection of this paper, found below. The MC also uses
a secure service on the AS to inform the AS of its current
location.
The SSA framework also allows the user to interact
with the local context-aware service using the MC. In So-
cialAwareFlicks, the user might use the MC to view informa-
tion about the movie trailer that is currently playing, such as
movie title and release date, and request that SocialAware-
Flicks skip the remainder of the current movie trailer and
begin playing the next movie trailer in the playlist. SSA ap-
plications treat the mechanism used for interaction with the
user as an abstracted bidirectional communication channel.
This abstraction is flexible enough to support user interaction
over a variety of network technologies, including short-range
wireless technologies such as Bluetooth or WiFi, or wireless
wide area network (WWAN) connectivity available on many
smartphones.
The broadcasting of an EID gives the MC active control
over its interaction with the SSA system. Rather than setting
a flag or updating a server resource which passively accepts
requests for social network information, the AS requires that
a nonce (EID) is actively sent from the MC. This makes it
impossible for the MC to be locked in an accepting state or
be locked in a specific location. A passive system may re-
sult in such a locked state if the MC loses communication
with the AS through a lost signal or loss of power. A mali-
cious user may intentionally attack a passive system through
blockingMC communication. The active EID broadcast pro-
tects against such an attack.
3.3 Authentication Server
The AS provides for nearly all of the security features
found in SSA. The AS is a web-accessible server that pro-
vides services for both the SC and the MC. Upon MC user
account signup, the AS assigns an initial EID to the mobile
user. The AS also stores the current location of a particular
MC, as specified by the MC, and the user name and pass-
word specified by the mobile user during account signup.
Upon SC user account signup, the AS stores the user name,
password, and SC’s location as specified by the SC admin-
istrator during account signup. The AS is assumed to be a
trusted component in SSA.
Before the MC can share it’s EID with a nearby SC, the
MC must retrieve it’s current EID from the AS and inform
the AS of it’s current location using secure services provided
by the AS. Access to these secure services is authenticated
using the MC’s user credentials, and all network traffic for
AS services is encrypted as mentioned above. The EID for
an MC user is updated to a new unique value, using a cryp-
tographic hash function with a random salt value, whenever
the SC accesses the AS service which provides a user’s social
network profile information. This EID update-logic prevents
replay attacks, since a stream of previously shared EIDs can
never be reused.
The AS provides a secure service to the SC that allows
the SC to retrieve social network profile information for an
MC user using that user’s EID. Access to this service is au-
thenticated using the SC account’s user credentials, and all
network traffic for this service is encrypted. The AS com-
putes the distance between the SC and the specified MC user,
and will only return the requested MC user’s social network
profile information if the mobile device is within some spec-
ified range of the SC. If the mobile device is outside of this
maximum acceptable range, then the request will be denied.
In our implementation of SSA, we define this maximum ac-
ceptable range to be 20 meters.
Figure 4 shows the architecture of the AS. In this figure,
the AS will perform either step 3b or step 3c after the SC re-
quests user information and preferences (step 3), depending
on whether or not the MC is located within the maximum
acceptable range of the SC as determined in step 3a.
3.4 Security and Privacy Features
The SSA provides several security features that address
the security threats outlined in the subsection of this paper
titled Privacy & Security Issues. The use of EIDs prevents
spoofing and replay attacks. Since EIDs, instead of social
network IDs (such as Facebook IDs), are shared by the MC,
a malicious user cannot spoof the social network identity of
another user. By using a cryptographic hash function with a
random salt value to generate each mobile user’s EID, and
continuously updating this EID with each use of an EID
value by the SC, we prevent replay attacks whereby a ma-
licious user may attempt to capture and reuse a sequence of
EID values previously shared by an MC.
We assume that all mobile devices that participate in SSA
use a secure positioning system, such as [16]. Such a system
prevents location spoofing. Our assumption of a secure po-
sitioning system also prevents wormhole attacks [15] using
EIDs, whereby a malicious user captures EIDs shared by a
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Figure 4. SSA Authentication Server architecture
MC in one location and retransmits them to an SC in another
location. A malicious user cannot capture an EID shared by
an MC and retransmit it somewhere else for sharing with a
distant SC, since the AS verifies that the mobile device cor-
responding to this EID is within an acceptable range of the
SC whenever the SC attempts to obtain social network infor-
mation for the mobile user.
We provide reasonable protection against eavesdropping
in SSA by encrypting all network traffic between the MC and
the AS, and between the SC and the AS, using a technology
such as HTTPS. Our use of encryption prevents interception
of user credentials and all other information passed between
these components.
The use of EIDs in our system provides important pri-
vacy features for SSA mobile users. Since the MC shares
only EIDs with the SC, a malicious user who has intercepted
these EIDs cannot connect these EIDs to a particular user’s
social network identity. Furthermore, the AS does not sup-
port the retrieval of certain personally identifiable informa-
tion from a user’s social network profile, such as the user’s
full name, email address, phone number, etc. Since the AS
does not support the retrieval of personally identifiable infor-
mation, the SC is unable to connect an EID to a user’s social
network identity. Thus, only by compromising the AS can
a malicious user tie an EID to a user’s social network ID.
Again, we assume that the AS is a secure and trusted system,
and that compromising such a system would prove to be a
formidable task.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
This section describes the implementation of the SSA
framework, an example prototype application called So-
cialAwareFlicks that uses SSA and shows the feasibility of
the framework, and an evaluation of our SSA implementa-
tion.
4.1 Implementation of the SSA Framework
The AS and SC were implemented using the Java Stan-
dard Edition (SE) 5.0 platform, while the MC was imple-
mented using the Java Micro Edition (ME) Mobile Informa-
tion Device Profile (MIDP) 2.0 platform. All interactions
between the SC and MC are managed using Bluetooth. The
BlueCove JSR-82 Emulator [17] tool was used to emulate all
Bluetooth connectivity.
The Marge framework [18] was used to implement all of
the Bluetooth communication logic in SSA. The Java API
for Bluetooth (JSR 82) [19] is fairly low-level and reason-
ably difficult to use for those who are not familiar with
the technical details of the Bluetooth standard. Marge pro-
vides an abstraction layer above JSR-82 that hides the low-
level details of managing Bluetooth connections, message
exchanges, protocols, device discovery, and service discov-
ery.
After the MC user signs up for a mobile user account on
the AS, the MC updates its location by accessing the appro-
priate web service on the AS, retrieves its EID from the AS
by using a web service, and then proceeds to launch a SSA
Bluetooth service that enables the user’s EID to be shared
with the SC. The MC uses the Marge framework to set up
and launch the SSA Bluetooth service.
The SC detects the EIDs shared by nearbyMCs by search-
ing for available mobile devices running the SSA Bluetooth
service. Since Bluetooth radios on mobile phones are Blue-
tooth Class 2 devices with an approximate range of 10 me-
ters, only nearby users will be detected. The SC registers
several listener objects with the Marge framework to man-
age the search for available mobile devices and to manage
the state of the connection to the mobile device. After de-
tecting an appropriate mobile device, we query the device to
determine the user’s EID. In the current implementation, the
user’s EID is encoded as the Bluetooth service name of the
SSA Bluetooth service running on the mobile device. We are
able to identify the SSA Bluetooth service by looking for a
particular universally unique identifier (UUID) advertised by
all mobile devices that run this service.
All AS services accessed by the MC and SC are ex-
posed as web services conforming to the REST architec-
ture [20]. We used the open source Reslet framework [21]
for Java to develop the AS. We expose each resource on the
AS, including a MC user’s EID, a MC user’s current loca-
tion, and the Facebook profile information for a MC user, as
separate URL-accessible resources supporting HTTP GET,
POST, and PUT methods as appropriate. Figure 5 shows the
web-accessible resources exposed on the AS, along with the
HTTP methods supported by each resource. The body of
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each HTTP request is encoded using JSON [22]. All web
service network traffic between the AS and SC, and between
the AS and MC, is encrypted using HTTPS, and access to all
resources is authenticated using HTTP basic access authen-
tication [23].
We implement all data persistence on the AS using the
open source SimpleJPA tool [24]. SimpleJPA is a Java Per-
sistence API (JPA) [25] implementation for Amazon’s Sim-
pleDB [26]. By using SimpleDB, we take advantage of
Amazon’s simple, scalable, and reliable distributed database
system. SimpleDB structures all data into domains. Our use
of SimpleJPA and SimpleDB allows us to easily launch new
AS instances that all communicate with the same set of do-
mains backed by a shared distributed database, providing for
an implementation of SSA that is quite scalable.
EIDs for each MC are generated on the AS using the
SHA-1 cryptographic hash function with a 16-byte random
salt value. A new EID for a user is generated on the AS
each time that the SC requests the Facebook profile infor-
mation for a user. The AS maintains a mapping of EIDs to
Facebook IDs in the persistence layer. The Facebook REST
API web service [12] is used by the AS to obtain the content
of fields on a user’s Facebook profile. Each time that a SC
requests the Facebook preferences for an MC user, the AS
checks the locations of the MC and the SC to verify that the
MC is within an acceptable range of the SC before returning
the requested information. In our AS implementation, we set
this maximum acceptable range to 20 meters.
4.2 Example Application: SocialAwareFlicks
We have implemented a context-aware mobile social net-
working application, called SocialAwareFlicks, which uses
SSA and demonstrates the feasibility of the SSA frame-
work. SocialAwareFlicks displays recommended movie
trailers that match the movie preferences of one or more
users jointly watching a common display. SocialAwareFlicks
could be deployed in locations such as video-rental establish-
ments for marketing purposes, to make customers aware of
new video rentals that match their interests. The version of
SocialAwareFlicks implemented using SSA is an enhance-
ment of the previous version of the SocialAwareFlicks appli-
cation described in [13], which used the SocialAware frame-
work and did not consider security and privacy issues.
The SC in SocialAwareFlicks detects the presence of
users watching a single common screen managed by the sys-
tem and shows recommended movie trailers based on the fa-
vorite movie preferences expressed on each user’s Facebook
Figure 6. Screenshot of prototypes of the SocialAware-
Flicks mobile and stationary components
profile. After detecting the presence of each nearby MC
and obtaining the EID shared by each MC, the SocialAware-
Flicks SC uses these EIDs to retrieve the Facebook movie
preferences for each mobile user by accessing the appropri-
ate web service on the AS. We assume that these movie pref-
erences are expressed as a comma-separated list of the user’s
favorite movies. The SC then uses the Netflix REST API
web service [14] to obtain a list of similar movies for each
of the user’s favorite movies. We assume that the user will
prefer to watch movies that are similar to his/her favorite
movies. After obtaining these recommendations for each
user, the SC uses heuristics to create an aggregate playlist
of movie titles that accommodates the preferences of the de-
tected users in the group. [13] describes these playlist gen-
erations heuristics in some detail. Finally, the SC attempts
to find a movie trailer file for each title on the playlist on the
local filesystem, and begins playing the trailers on the screen
using the VLC media player [27].
Figure 6 shows a screenshot of the current prototypes of
the SocialAwareFlicks MC and SC. The MC for one user is
running in the MicroEmulator [28] window, while the SC
has generated a movie trailer playlist for this user and in-
voked VLC to begin playing trailers from this playlist. VLC
is playing the trailer for the film “A Scanner Darkly”.
4.3 Evaluation
Performance metrics were gathered for the SSA Authenti-
cation Server. All performance testing was performed using
a Macbook Pro notebook running Mac OS X 10.5, with a 2.4
GHz Core2Duo processor, 4 GB of RAM, and a university-
provided high-speed Internet connection.
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Figure 7. Scaling of SSA AS as the number of concurrent
MC requests increases
Our AS performance test shows how the AS scales as the
number of MCs in the system increases. For this test, an in-
creasing number of MCs are configured to concurrently send
requests to the AS. Each MC sends a HTTP GET request to
retrieve it’s current EID, followed by a HTTP PUT request
to inform the AS of it’s current location. We set each MC to
maintain a constant throughput of 20 HTTP GET requests
and 20 HTTP PUT requests sent per minute. These MC
requests are simulated using the Apache JMeter [29] load-
ing testing tool, and all requests are sent using HTTPS. Fig-
ure 7 shows a graph of the average execution time for each
request as the number of concurrent MC request threads in-
creases. In this test, each MC device is simulated by an MC
request thread. We see from this graph that average exe-
cution time for each put-location request remains approxi-
mately constant as the number of concurrent MC requests
increases, while the average execution time for each get-EID
request increases gradually. These results show that the AS
scales reasonably well.
We also measured the end-to-end processing time for So-
cialAwareFlicks SC favorite movie list retrieval process for
a user, which is a measure of the time required for the MC to
retrieve an EID from the AS, the SC to get an EID from the
MC over Bluetooth, and the SC to then retrieve the list of the
MC user’s favorite movies from the AS. Our measurements
of this end-to-end operation revealed a mean processing time
of 1263 ms, with a standard error of 44.31 ms. This shows
that the SC can retrieve the list of a mobile user’s favorite
movies reasonably quickly upon detection of an MC.
Note that all testing was performed in our local computing
environment, so all data persistence communication between
the AS deployment and SimpleDB traversed the Internet to
reach Amazon’s remote server data centers for SimpleDB.
Thus, the round-trip latency between our AS deployment and
Amazon’s data centers dominated the processing time for
each request sent to the AS. We expect that the time to pro-
cess each request on the AS would be substantially reduced
if we deploy the AS within Amazon’s data centers using the
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud service [30].
5 Background and Related Work
This section will discuss the major motivating factors or
changes in technology and society which drive this work.
In particular recent developments in both mobile computing
and social networks are discussed along with how these two
areas are increasingly intersecting. Following this, a set of
example applications which mix social networks with mo-
bile computing are discussed along with a their associated
security and privacy threats.
5.1 Mobile Computing
Advances in cell-phone connectivity and the ever-more
ubiquitous smartphone have brought the Internet into the
pockets of individuals anywhere, anytime. Along with the
ability to always be “connected”, social networks have devel-
oped resulting in very high penetration rates within certain
communities (in particular college campuses). This means
that within many social contexts there is a high number of
social network users with mobile computing devices.
5.2 Social Networks
Online social networks have been exploding in popularity
over the last few years. According to Facebook.com’s statis-
tics page, the site has over 200 million active users [3], of
which over 100 million log on everyday. To compare this
with ComScore’s global Internet usage statistics [31], this
would imply that nearly 1 in 10 of all Internet users log on
to Facebook everyday and that the active Facebook Internet
population is larger than any country’s Internet population
(China is the largest with 179.7 million Internet users [31]).
Facebook has recently become very popular among mobile
users. According to Facebook statistics (March 2009) there
are currently over 30 million active mobile users of Face-
book, and those users are almost 50% more active on Face-
book than non-mobile users.
5.3 Existing Mobile Social Network Applica-
tions
As mentioned previously, SSA builds on the authors’
prior work on WhozThat [1] and SocialAware [13]. Both
of these systems enable the creation of context-aware appli-
cations that exploit user information from social networking
sites.
Most current approaches toward integrating social net-
works with mobile devices have missed the opportunity to
bind social context tightly with the local context of interact-
ing people. These approaches simply extend the Web in-
terface of the social network to the mobile device, by pro-
viding a view of the user’s social network on his/her mobile
phone[32]. Recent work such as CenceMe has sought to en-
rich the amount of information flowing in the direction from
the mobile device to the social network, e.g. the location of
the user and perhaps context cues such as whether the per-
son is talking [33]. While these cues provide more infor-
mation about the user’s context, they do not integrate social
network information about nearby users with the user’s local
context. In contrast, the WhozThat system concepts used by
SSA applications exploit mobile computing technology to
import contextual information from social networking sites
into the user’s local physical environment. Serendipity [2]
is a system similar to WhozThat that imports social context
into the local context using mobile devices. However, it pop-
ulates its own database of social context information rather
then connecting with popular online social networking sites,
and does not consider the development of context-aware ap-
plications as discussed in this paper.
Commercial location-aware mobile social networking
services, such as BrightKite [8] and Loopt [7], provide some
of the functionality found in WhozThat and SSA. However,
like Serendipity, these services populate their own databases
with social networking and context information, rather than
leveraging popular online social networking sites such as
Facebook. Also like Serendipity, these services do not con-
sider the development of context-aware applications such as
those enabled by SSA.
5.4 Privacy & Security
That mobile social networks present significant privacy
problems is very apparent. Many projects have identified and
presented solutions to some of these problems. Duke Univer-
sity’s SmokeScreen project [5] uses “cliques” between users
which are then resolved through a trusted broker system. As-
suming that users know/trust each other they are then able
to “sense” each other’s presence. This project targeted the
problems of snooping and power efficiency on mobile de-
vices. Another related work out of Duke University is called
“We Saw each other on the Subway” [6]. This paper chooses
not to trust the central server system or other peers. It al-
lows for users that were coincident in time and space to ver-
ify such a coincidence at a later time without compromis-
ing their “peer-to-server” or “peer-to-peer” anonymity. Peo-
pletones [34] allowed for users to share their information
through shared cell tower coverage. This provided a par-
tial or fuzzy location sharing service. The SlyFi project [35]
protected privacy through obfuscating even the identifier bits
such as MAC address and other protocol fields that 802.11
would normally rely on to route packets. It then achieved
reasonable performance without these identifiers, protecting
the physical address of the user device.
6 Future Work
This paper provides a general architecture which connects
users’ social network information with location-based ser-
vices anonymously. However, this architecture does not im-
ply a specific implementation of any particular component.
For instance EID’s could be exchanged over different wire-
less/cellular protocols instead of Bluetooth. They could also
be managed through a centralized infrastructure on the Inter-
net or integrated into a peer-to-peer trust network. We intend
to explore these alternative implementations in the future.
The way in which preferences are chosen and returned to
the SC could be optimized for different metrics. In particular
this mechanism could be designed to provide k-anonymity
for a set of users EIDs rather than just one at a time. This
problem relates to a more general set theory problem in
which a set of social network information associated with
a set of users is chosen such that the set of preferences can-
not map back to any one or any set of the users within some
guarantee. This problem may apply to more uses of social
network information than just applications of the type de-
scribed in this paper.
An area that we have chosen not to deal with in this pa-
per is that of user-specified privacy controls on his/her social
network data. It is understood that there are certain special
cases for which a user may want certain information shared
or not shared and more comprehensive tools must be devel-
oped to support this. Facebook has been developing tools for
users to control their information at a finer granularity and
these controls are respected by our system. However, we
recognize that users may still feel that they do not have full
control over how their information is used and this issue will
continue to be important to the development of social net-
works in general, and mobile social networks in particular.
7 Conclusion
This work describes a novel framework to support an
anonymous exchange of social network information with
real-world location-based systems, allowing truly context-
aware systems without compromising users’ security and
privacy. Secure SocialAware provides an information ex-
change solution which could support many different appli-
cation models that currently require users to give full access
to their identity and information. We hope that this work will
convince users and developers that it is possible to move for-
ward with creative mobile social network applications with-
out further compromising user security and privacy.
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